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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, after three years of deliberation, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uni-
form Law Commissioners' Model Sentencing and Corrections Act.
2
The Model Act provisions govern the organization of those agen-
cies of state government charged with correctional activities, the
process of sentencing criminal offenders, and the treatment of sen-
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
1. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (1979)
[hereinafter cited as MSCA]. The authors were reporters for the Model Act
and Professor Potuto also served as project director. Richard Singer,
Professor of Law, Rutgers University-Newark, participated as a reporter from
1975 to 1977. This article is based on the prefatory notes and comments to the
Model Act and on a report written by the authors and submitted to the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration upon completion of the Model
Sentencing and Corrections Act drafting project. See H. Perlman & J. Potuto,
Staff Report to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration on Uniform
Law Commissioners' Model Sentencing and Corrections Act (Sept. 1, 1978).
Since the authors were responsible for the language in the prefatory notes
and comments to the Act, they have made no attempt to indicate where, in
this article, portions of those texts have been used verbatim.
2. The Model Act was developed pursuant to Grant Number 76 NI-99-0022 from
the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law En-
forcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice. In 1974
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted
and published its proposed Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Uni-
form Rules established the procedure governing the criminal justice system
from prior arrest to sentencing. In a few instances, rules regulating the proc-
ess of sentencing were also included, but the basis for sentencing criminal
offenders and the nature of correctional programs were not addressed. In
1973 a committee of the National Conference was formed to examine the pos-
sibility of carrying the work, begun with the Uniform Rules, forward through
the sentencing and correctional phases. In 1974, LEAA provided the neces-
sary funds for the project to proceed.
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tenced offenders and persons confined prior to trial. In addition,
provisions governing the collateral consequences of conviction and
programs for the assistance of victims are proposed. The
processes of the juvenile courts, including the system of correc-
tions applied to juvenile offenders, are excluded from the coverage
of the Model Act.
The drafting project began at a propitious time. A year earlier
the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals (National Advisory Commission) had published its re-
port on Corrections 3 offering a wide-ranging set of recommenda-
tions for reform, one of which was the call for wholesale reform of
the correctional laws of the fifty states. The Special Committee to
Draft the Model Act (Special Committee) 4 relied heavily on this
pioneering work.
The fundamental bases for sentencing criminal offenders were
also undergoing a major re-examination. The traditional approach
to sentencing, adopted by the National Advisory Commission and
earlier by the American Bar Association in its Criminal Justice
Standards, 5 consisted of a system of judicial sentencing designed
to tailor the sentence in each particular case to the needs of the
offender and of society. Although there were recommendations to
reduce or to structure the discretion of the sentencing court, the
system proposed in these reports remained primarily discretion-
ary. Parole was also a critical element of the envisioned system,
although here again, recommendations were offered to structure
the discretion of paroling authorities.
As the Special Committee began its work, a series of proposals
from a variety of different study groups suggested abandoning the
traditional practices. 6 The universal feature of these proposals
was the recognition that individualized sentencing had failed and
should be replaced by a system that provided less disparity of
3. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, CORRECTIONS (1973) [hereinafter cited as NAC].
4. This was the committee of Uniform Law Commissioners with primary re-
sponsibility for drafting the Act. For more detailed information as to the
composition and work of the Special Committee see text accompanying notes
136-39 infra.
5. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES
(Final Draft, 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS].
6. See, e.g., D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR COR-
RECTIONS (1975); M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER
(1972); W. GAYLIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: A STUDY OF BIAS IN SENTENCING (1974);
N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUS-
TICE (1976); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,
STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1970); TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT
(1976) [hereinafter cited as TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND].
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sentences among sentenced defendants. The indeterminate sen-
tence with parole was to be replaced by a flat, determinate sen-
tence.7 The discretion to select a particular sentence was to be
severely restricted, either by legislative mandate or by other de-
vices. Sentences were no longer to reflect the rehabilitative poten-
tial of the defendant or an official prediction of the dangerousness
of the defendant but were to insure a punishment justly deserved
for the offense committed.
In the late 1960's the courts abandoned what had become
known as the "hands off" doctrine under which courts refused to
intervene to review the decisions of correctional administrators or
the conditions of correctional programs.8 Instead, courts began to
measure correctional practices against constitutional principles
and in many instances the existing practices fell short.9 Since
these early beginnings, nearly every aspect of correctional pro-
grams has been evaluated by courts. Although in some cases, dra-
matic change was ordered, it became clear that significant progress
would not come easily through judicial decrees. Often, lack of
funds prevented prisons from meeting minimum standards even
where those in charge of the institution desired to make a change.
In a few cases federal courts actually took over the operation of a
prison in order to correct unconstitutional conditions and prac-
tices.' 0 The National Advisory Commission recognized that a com-
prehensive legislative codification of the rights of persons subject
to correctional authority was needed to avoid "the slow, painful,
and expensive process of ... case-by-case litigation.""
The National Advisory Commission also examined and evalu-
ated existing legislative proposals relating to sentencing and cor-
rections. 12 Most of the available proposed codifications were
developed before the courts had begun to impose constitutional
standards on correctional programs. Other proposed legislation
addressed relatively specific problems and did not 1rovide a com-
7. For a general discussion of these terms, see Singer, In Favor of "Presumptive
Sentences" Set by a Sentencing Commission, 24 CRimE AND DELINQUENcY 401
(1978).
8. For a discussion of the hands-off doctrine, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,
321-22 (1972) (per curiam); Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A
Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STA. L. REv. 473, 503-04 (1971).
See also Champagne & Haas, The Impact of Johnson v. Avery on Prison Ad-
ministration, 43 TENN. L. REV. 275 (1976).
9. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971).
10. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 283
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
11. NAC, supra note 3, at 558.
12. Id. at 549-52.
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prehensive or coordinated statutory framework for correctional re-
form. Although many of these earlier proposals, including the
Model Penal Code 13 and the Study Draft of a New Federal Crimi-
nal Code,14 provided a starting point for committee deliberation,
the Model Sentencing and Corrections Act goes far beyond earlier
attempts to define statutorily the treatment of offenders. Also, the
sentencing provisions of the Model Act are based on different
premises than these earlier proposals.
The purpose of this article is to describe the development of the
Model Act and to provide an overview of its provisions. This article
also discusses the major policy decisions which serve as the foun-
dation for the provisions of the Act. These policy decisions were
based on the perception of the "state of the art" of corrections ini-
tially held by the authors and subsequently accepted or modified,
in whole or in part, by the Special Committee to Draft the Model
Act. 15 Several of the major themes of the Act are discussed with
some examples of how these themes were incorporated into the
statutory provisions. The article also describes the process by
which the Act was drafted and the nature of the outside advice and
consultation that was available to the Special Committee.
II. GENERAL APPROACHES
If one observation emerges from the events of recent years and
the recommendations of those groups that have studied sentenc-
ing and corrections, it is that these systems are in need of immedi-
ate, pervasive and, in some instances, drastic reform. 16 The
prevalent sentencing and corrections systems have few defenders,
and it is widely recognized that society is incurring substantial
human and material costs by delaying change. The unanimity on
the need for change is not, however, matched by universal agree-
ment on the direction which change should take.
The sentencing process utilized by most states is characterized
by largely unfettered judicial discretion. In each of these states
13. MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
14. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, supra note 6.
15. This article reflects the views of the authors with respect to the drafting proc-
ess and the underlying policies governing the final provisions of the Model
Act. This article has not been formally approved by the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws nor does it necessarily reflect the views of the Commis-
sioners, the Special Committee to Draft the Act, the Review Committee to the
Act, or any of those individuals or groups acting as advisors in the drafting of
the Act.
16. See, e.g., ABA JOINT COMM. ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS, STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS, reprinted in 14 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 375 (1977) [hereinafter citedas ABA JOINT COMM.]; NAC, supra note 3,
at 141-47; note 6 supra.
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the legislature has established a broad range of permissible penal-
ties for each offense and the sentencing court is authorized to se-
lect some sentence within the range, the selection to be based on a
mixture of traditional policies regarding rehabilitation, deterrence,
punishment and incapacitation. Limited appellate review of the
sentencing judge's decision is available,' 7 and the court's sentenc-
ing decision is, in many cases, subservient to subsequent parole
board decisions. The result is a system that produces substantial
disparities in sentencing, both within the sentences imposed by a
single judge and between judges in a given jurisdiction.
The corrections system is largely hidden from public view ex-
cept in unusual circumstances such as a prison riot, an escape, or a
subsequent offense by a person released from confinement. In
more recent years the courts have brought to public view the harsh
and inhumane conditions that exist in many correctional institu-
tions. Against this background three general observations gov-
erned the nature of the reform proposals contained in the Model
Sentencing and Corrections Act.
A. The Need for Legislative Leadership and Responsibility
Most proposals for sentencing and correctional reform have rec-
ognized the need for legislative leadership if meaningful reform is
to take place.18 State legislative codes governing these critical
functions of state government are in many cases sorely outdated.
Many provide little authority to the correctional staff to take pro-
gressive action; on the other hand, they provide few restraints on
administrative power, restraints necessary to protect persons sub-
ject to correctional programs. In sentencing, legislatures have
largely abandoned to the courts and boards of parole not only the
responsibility to impose the appropriate sentence in individual
cases but also to adopt principles for sentencing generally.
This abdication of legislative leadership has had undesirable re-
sults throughout the criminal justice system. The failure to articu-
late through the political system the purposes and principles of
sentencing has resulted in a lack of public confidence in the sen-
17. In 1968 the American Bar Association found that twenty-one states author-
ized appellate sentencing review. ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note
5, at 13. It was concluded, however, that in only fifteen states was it realisti-
cally available in all cases. Id. Moreover, indeterminate sentencing schemes
by their nature vest wide discretion in the sentencing court. Singer, supra
note 7. Appellate review is thus made difficult because there is no standard
against which to measure the exercise of discretion by the sentencing judge.
See, e.g., Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predict-
ability, and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.J.
975, 1051-52 (1978).
18. See, e.g., NAC, supra note 3, at 143; ABA JoiNT CoMm., supra note 16, at 588.
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tencing process. The wide disparities in sentences, the lack of ar-
ticulated premises and the apparent ineffectiveness of sentencing
practices are difficult to explain to the body politic. The failure to
maintain a sentencing system that can be rationalized to the gen-
eral public has forced the public to respond to the perceived "cri-
sis" in crime on an emotional level. Calls for harsher, longer or
mandatory sentences for certain serious offenses are symptomatic
of this lack of confidence.
The failure of legislation to deal with the conditions in correc-
tional facilities left the courts little choice but to intervene. But
judicial intervention, while necessary and appropriate, resulted in
disruption and uncertainty in correctional administration. As the
National Advisory Commission recognized, reform by court decree
is often disruptive, expensive and only partially effective. 19 The ar-
ticulation of a code of conduct relating to the treatment of those
convicted of crime by the legislature would reassert the leadership
essential for substantial and wide-scale improvement in correc-
tional practices. The Model Sentencing and Corrections Act is
based on the assumption that legislative leadership in this area is
necessary if true reform is to take place.
B. The Need for Specificity
A legislative framework for corrections should differ from tradi-
tional legislation establishing other administrative agencies. In
many instances a lack of knowledge about human behavior re-
quires that correctional decision-makers take risks and the public
is less than sympathetic when those risks turn into realities. In-
deed, programs for criminal offenders attract little sympathy from
the public-at-large and are often perceived to be instances of "cod-
dling criminals." Since the function of corrections is particularly
controversial, correctional administrators have understandably
been reluctant to implement programs of any far-reaching signifi-
cance without specific legislative approval.
Legislation dealing with correctional reform must also take into
account the unsavory side of the history of corrections in which
there was a systematic denial of the rights and interests of con-
fined persons.20 The courts have found that conditions within pris-
ons may constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and various
practices have been held to violate other constitutional require-
19. NAC, supra note 3, at 588.
20. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); NAC, supra note 3, at 18.
For examples of legislative responses to the exploitation of prisoner labor,
see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:862 (West 1967); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 555
(West 1978). See generally G. RUSCHE & 0. KIRCKHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND
SOCIAL STRUCTURE 42, 65 (1939).
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ments.
2 1
Both the need of correctional administrators for specific legisla-
tive support for programs and the need of convicted persons for
legislative protection against excessive administrative power re-
sulted in the Model Act being considerably more specific than
most codifications. A legislative framework for correctional pro-
grams should be as specific as possible to support the correctional
administrator in implementation and to assure the public that ap-
propriate safeguards are provided for the public safety. A code of
rights for convicted persons requires specificity since details can-
not be left to administrative discretion when the provision is di-
rected toward alleviating abuses or potential abuses of that very
discretion. Thus, the Model Act contains many provisions that
have considerable detail.
C. The Need for the Rule of Law in Sentencing and Corrections
The major approach of the Model Sentencing and Corrections
Act is its attempt to impose the rule of law on the existing systems
of sentencing and corrections. That attempt focuses primarily on
the control and structuring of the discretion exercised by sentenc-
ing courts and correctional officials.2 2 As indicated above, the
traditional legal framework for sentencing and corrections left
most decisions to the discretion of the decision-maker. Sentencing
courts were free within only nominal boundaries to impose any
sentence they thought appropriate. In a similar manner, correc-
tional administrators were largely free from controls.
Much of the Model Act is based on the simple premise that
there ought to be no outpost of lawlessness in a free society. The
law is, in large measure, designed to protect the individual citizen
from actual or potential governmental abuse. The Act is premised
on the notion that there is nothing inherent in the processes of
sentencing or corrections that ought to exempt either from that
principle. It should be understood that this premise is not based
on a perception that sentencing judges or correctional administra-
tors systematically abuse their powers. Rather, the Act reflects the
21. E.g., Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), affd, 501 F.2d 1291
(5th Cir. 1974); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affid, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). See
generally Alexander, The Captive Patient: The Treatment of Health Problems
in American Prisons, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 16 (1972); Hirschkop and Mil-
lemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L REv. 795 (1969).
22. Many of the provisions of the Act are derived from long standing techniques
utilized to regulate administrative discretion. See NAC, supra note 3, at 555
(Standard 16.2); PRESmENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCmTY, at 179-81
(1967). See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
perception that legal constraints on governmental power are im-
portant to guard against potential abuse as well as to remedy in-
stances of actual abuse.
Application of the rule of law to sentencing and corrections re-
quires a careful balance in order to insure that the governmental
functions can be effectively conducted while at the same time sub-
jecting official power to carefully drawn limits. It is to this balance
that many of the provisions of the Model Act are addressed.
The discretion of sentencing courts is restrained by the estab-
lishment of legislative principles and purposes, and the enactment
of sentencing guidelines which provide the court with a presump-
tively correct sentence. Although the court remains free to impose
a sentence other than the presumptively correct one, it must then
articulate its reasons for doing so, and its decision is subject to ap-
pellate review. The "protected interests" of confined persons in
the correctional area are specifically announced, and the authority
of the correctional administrator to limit or restrict the realization
of these interests is limited to those situations in which a particu-
lar and compelling governmental interest is at stake.23 In addition,
techniques traditionally imposed on administrative agencies such
as notice-and-comment rule making24 and judicial review of deci-
sions25 are imposed on correctional agencies. All of these tech-
niques have been used successfully with agencies dealing with
citizens in the free world and should be equally available to con-
victed persons.
The imposition of the rule of law to sentencing and corrections
was adopted as a basic premise of the Model Act primarily because
a society that truly values liberty and individual rights can do no
less. Secondarily, but nonetheless importantly, there is sufficient
evidence to suggest that fairness within these systems will also
make them more effective in performing their prescribed func-
tions. An offender who believes himself to be the victim of an un-
principled sentencing system is unlikely to be receptive to
correctional or rehabilitative programs. An offender who is treated
unfairly or is forced to live in squalid and inhumane conditions is
unlikely to develop the healthy respect for law and society that is
23. See text accompanying notes 77-78 infra. 1.
24. MSCA § 1-103 [Adoption of Rules; Procedures]. This section was patterned
after the MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT (1961), also promul-
gated by the Uniform Law Commissioners.
25. MSCA § 1-104 [Judicial Review of Contested Cases]. This section was pat-
terned after section 15 of the MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
(1961). It permits judicial review on the administrative record and reversal of
an administrative decision if it violates constitutional, statutory or adminis-
trative provisions or is in excess of departmental authority or is clearly erro-
neous or arbitrary and capricious.
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required to live a crime-free life upon release. Adjustment to the
free world upon release from confinement is likely to be effective
only if the offender has learned, while confined, to accept the re-
sponsibilities and limits of living in a free society.
Thus, while it might be argued that individual provisions of the
Model Act may make the administration of correctional programs
more difficult or more costly, it is the belief of the authors that in
its totality the Model Act establishes a regime that is more compat-
ible both with our traditional notions of justice and with an effec-
tive governmental response to criminal conduct.
Ill. MAJOR UNDERLYING THEMES
The Prefatory Note to the Model Act lists the following underly-
ing themes of the Act:
-The Act unifies the various elements of the correctional system into
one department of corrections in order to coordinate the deployment of
scarce correctional resources and to make correctional programs consis-
tent and effective.
-The Act implements the legislative responsibility for determining ba-
sic correctional purposes and policies and, in several sections, legislatively
established criteria and goals for decision-making are announced.
-The Act seeks to reduce the unfairness and ineffectiveness occa-
sioned by sentencing disparity. Rehabilitation is eliminated as a goal of
sentencing. Sentences, based on the punishment deserved for the offense,
are determined by courts in accordance with statutory and administrative
guidelines. Appellate review of sentences is authorized. Parole is abol-
ished.
-Although rehabilitation is no longer a factor in determining
sentences, within the sentence imposed the Act seeks to enhance the re-
habilitative potential of correctional environments by authorizing a wide
variety of programs and giving offenders a greater voice in, and accord-
ingly a greater incentive for, their own self-improvement.
-The Act also seeks to recognize the interests of victims in the sen-
tencing and correctional process.
-Most importantly, the Act strives to bring justice and the rule of law
to the correctional process.
2 6
In addition to these basic policy approaches each major Article
of the Model Act was built on one or two major themes. The Act
consists of six articles. Article 1 includes general provisions and
rule-making procedures. 27 Article 2, providing for creation of a
26. MSCA at 5-6.
27. In many instances throughout the Act the director is obligated to exercise his
discretion through formally adopted rules. The procedure for adopting rules
allows participation by persons subject to the rules. The existence of rules
will facilitate uniform application of policies throughout the department and
provide a measure of protection against arbitrary action by subordinates.
The public nature of the rules will assist in creating a greater public aware-
ness of the operation of the department.
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state-wide Department of Corrections, establishes general organi-
zational provisions designed to leave maximum opportunity for ad-
ministrative flexibility in fashioning a detailed organizational
structure to implement the substantive provisions of the Act. Arti-
cle 3 describes the fundamental policies behind the sentencing
provisions and sets forth the available sentencing alternatives and
procedures designed to effectuate these policies. Article 4 pro-
vides a code of treatment of offenders, including an articulation of
the protected interests of confined persons. Article 5 establishes
procedures to assist victims of criminal offenses. Article 6 governs
the transition from prior law to the provisions of the Act.
A. Establishment and Unification of Correctional Systems-Article 2
The provisions of Article 2 of the Model Act relate to the organi-
zation of the correctional system and the allocation and regulation
of administrative authority. The thrust of the Article is to improve
correctional programs, services and facilities. Although it is recog-
nized that statutory provisions alone cannot insure effective cor-
rections, a sound legislative framework is a prerequisite to the
administrative development of a workable program.
The major policy position implemented in the Act with respect
to organization is the unification of all adult correctional programs
under one department of corrections. Historically, correctional
agencies and, thereby, correctional programs, have been frag-
mented within a jurisdiction with no overall direction.28 Until re-
cently, in many states each correctional facility operated as an
independent governmental agency subject only to general supervi-
sion by a board of corrections. In many states community-based
programs such as probation and parole are administered sepa-
rately from the facility-based correctional agency. In most states
misdemeanant and pretrial detention facilities are operated by lo-
cal law enforcement agencies. Consistent with most national stud-
ies of correctional systems, Article 2 and other provisions of this
Act seek to bring all adult correctional programs within one
agency-a unified department of corrections. 29
28. This situation is changing. In fact, several legislative formulations proposing
various levels of unification served as models for the development of some of
Article 2. See Unified Code of Corrections, ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 38, §§ 1001-1-1
to 1008-5-1 (Smith-Hurd 1973); Nebraska Treatment and Corrections Act, NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 83-170 to -1,135 (Reissue 1976); Advisory Comm'n on Intergov-
ernmental Relations, State Dep't of Correction Act (1971); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 401; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY STANDARD ACT
FOR STATE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES (1966).
29. See NAC, supra note 3, at 560 (Standard 16.4). See also ADVISORY COMM'N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LocAL RELATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 55 (1971) (unification of all programs except local jails);
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At present twenty-two states have placed administrative au-
thority over adult probation, parole and correctional institutions in
one state agency, although some retain overlapping local probation
systems.30 Four states place these three programs in three sepa-
rate agencies.3 1 The breakdown between state and local responsi-
bility for various aspects of the correctional system is shown in the
following table:
Number of Jurisdictions with Indicated Responsibilities
3 2
(Fifty States, D.C., Canal Zone & Puerto Rico)
Local State State/Local
Program Resp. Resp. Resp.
Juvenile detention 43 8 2
Juvenile probation 26 8 19
Juvenile institutions 0 50 0
Juvenile aftercare 4 47 2
Misdemeanant probation 13 19 9
Adult probation 9 32 12
Jails 43 9 1
Adult institutions 0 53 0
Adult parole 0 53 0
The arguments in favor of unification are based on notions of
effectiveness and efficiency. Correctional programming should be
consistent and coordinate, particularly when the same individual
often is subject to more than one element of the correctional sys-
tem. An offender subject at relatively short intervals to pretrial de-
tention, probation and confinement should not confront
inconsistent philosophies or expectations. His gradual reintegra-
tion into the free society may require an overall program that
builds on past experience.
Consolidated authority over correctional programs will also al-
low the efficient utilization and allocation of scarce resources. In
many instances professional counselors can assist confined per-
sons as well as persons on supervision in the community. Consoli-
dation also provides economies of scale which allow greater
AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 151-
170 (3d ed. 1966).
30. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASS'N DIRECTORY (Juvenile and Adult Correctional
Departments, Institutions, Agencies and Paroling Authorities) (1975-76) at
250-57.
31. Id. at 257.
32. Id. See also California Bd. of Corrections, Coordinated California Correc-
tions: The System (1971); Final Report of the Prison Study Comm., A Unified
System of Correction (Conn. 1957). Many states report plans for further uni-
fying correctional activities. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
Recent Criminal Justice Unification, Consolidation and Coordination Efforts
(Jan. 1976).
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flexibility in providing programs and services. Finally, unification
facilitates long-range planning, the development of training and
personnel programs, and the research and evaluation of past ef-
forts.
In keeping with the nature of a model law designed for imple-
mentation in fifty states, the organizational structure of the depart-
ment was kept flexible. The Act creates four divisions within the
department of corrections and two independent offices. The pro-
gram-based divisions--division of facility-based services, 33 divi-
sion of community-based services, 3 4 and division of jail
administration 35-are created primarily as legal devices to regu-
late sentencing practices. Article 3 requires that offenders be sen-
tenced to a particular division within the department. The director
is, however, authorized to appoint a single person as associate di-
rector of more than one division and to otherwise coordinate the
activities of the division.36 This may be particularly appropriate in
small states.
The fourth division, the division of medical services,3 7 which
provides medical services to persons in the custody of the depart-
ment, is created as a separate division for substantive reasons. De-
livery of medical care to confined persons often comes into conflict
with the security and administrative needs of facilities. The sepa-
rate division provides medical personnel with some independence
from facility administrators while at the same time retaining de-
partmental control and responsibility for medical services.
The effectiveness of the office of correctional legal services,38
which provides legal services for persons in the custody of the de-
partment, depends on its independence from direct supervision by
the department of corrections. The office staff may have to contest
33. MSCA §§ 2-301 to -303. This division administers programs, services and facil-
ities primarily for felony offenders sentenced to continuous confinement.
MSCA § 2-301.
34. MSCA §§ 2-201 to -204. This division administers programs, services, and fa-
cilities for persons sentenced or transferred to its custody, pretrial releases
and victims. MSCA § 2-201.
35. MSCA §§ 2-401 to -405. This division administers programs, services and facil-
ities primarily for misdemeanants sentenced to continuous confinement and
pretrial detainees. MSCA § 2-401.
36. MSCA § 2-106(2).
37. MSCA §§ 2-501 to -503. The right of a confined person to receive medical care
is a protected interest. MSCA § 4-105 [Medical Care]. See also MSCA §§ 4-
106 [Right to Healthful Environment] and 4-107 [Physical Exercise].
38. MSCA §§ 2-601 to -603. The right of a confined person to receive legal assist-
ance is a protected interest. MSCA § 4-108 [Legal Assistance]. See also
MSCA §§ 4-109 [Participating in the Legal Process] and 4-110 [Access to Le-
gal Materials]. The other independent office created by the Act is that of Cor-
rectional Mediation. MSCA §§ 4-201 to -207.
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actions of departmental personnel; yet, they must retain the confi-
dence of the correctional administration as well as that of persons
in the custody of the department. The effectiveness of the office
requires an independence from-and the confidence of-both em-
ployees and confined persons.
Beyond these provisions, the director is given full authority to
organize the department and to create additional divisions. Larger
systems, for example, may develop separate divisions for research,
planning, purchasing, administration or other activities.
The second major purpose of Article 2 is to allocate and regu-
late correctional authority. Historically, the legislative delegation
of authority to correctional administrators has been framed in rela-
tively broad language. Indeed, in some jurisdictions facilities or
agencies are created and their operation left to administrative dis-
cretion without further guidance. This type of statutory founda-
tion can have adverse effects. First, left without legislative
guidance or support, some correctional administrators may be
hesitant to attempt to implement new and promising ideas for fear
of public or legislative discontent or from doubt as to the limits of
their authority. Second, without legislative direction, the thrust of
correctional programming over time will be erratic, and each new
change in administration will bring its own method of operation
based on its own perception of public policy. Third, legislative re-
straint on administrative discretion is necessary to insure that per-
sons in the custody of the department are treated fairly.
Article 2 contains provisions to confine, structure and check ad-
ministrative discretion without unduly interfering with the flex-
ibility and authority needed to administer correctional facilities
and programs effectively. In some provisions, goals are legisla-
tively established and relevant considerations and factors for deci-
sion-making are stated.39
1. Overview of Article 2
Part 1 of Article 2 establishes the centralized department of cor-
rections and provides for its authority and responsibilities. Provi-
sions in this part have general application throughout the
programs of the department. Parts 2, 3 and 4 create the operational
divisions of the department. The division of facility-based services
has responsibility for major correctional facilities including pris-
ons and other long-term confinement institutions. The division of
community-based services provides a cluster of programs and
services that have a general community orientation. It is this divi-
sion that has custody over persons sentenced to community super-
39. MSCA §§2-701 to -706 [Facility Design and Construction].
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vision. It might also have administrative responsibility for half-
way houses and other facilities not used for continuous confine-
ment. The jail administration division would govern those facili-
ties traditionally thought of as local jails, including pretrial
detention facilities and misdemeanant confinement institutions.
Part 5 establishes a division of medical services responsible for all
aspects of medical services in departmental facilities. Part 6 estab-
lishes an independent office of correctional legal services to pro-
vide legal assistance to confined persons. The office is authorized
to provide both legal counsel and paralegal assistance. Part 7 pro-
vides legislative direction for the planning and design of new cor-
rectional facilities.
B. Sentencing-Article 3
Article 3 contains provisions relating to the selection, imposi-
tion, and execution of sentences for violation of criminal laws. The
major policy decisions reflected in the Article are: 1) the recogni-
tion of just deserts rather than rehabilitation or individual predic-
tions of dangerousness as the major factor in sentencing and
release decisions; 40 2) the reduction and structuring of judicial
sentencing discretion by establishment of a presumptively appro-
priate sentence to be imposed unless there is good cause not to do
so;41 and 3) the adoption of a flat sentencing system for sentences
to confinement by abolition of parole.42
For many years the American system of sentencing has sought
to achieve four goals: deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation,
and retribution. Both the American Bar Association and the
American Law Institute have proposed that all of these goals are
legitimate considerations in appropriate cases.4 3 This multi-goal
system of sentencing has resulted in variations on one basic model
within the states-judicial imposition of an indeterminate sen-
tence and discretionary release by a parole board. This model
sought to promote individualized treatment of offenders ("let the
punishment fit the criminal not the crime"), to limit the coercive
power of the state by requiring a utilitarian rather than a retribu-
tive end and to protect society by applying just the right amount of
40. MSCA at 89.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 5, § 2.2; MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.9.
See also NAC, supra note 3, at 150 (Standard 5.2); NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME &
DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT (2d ed. 1972). The American Bar As-
sociation recently moved in the direction of the Model Act. ABA SENTENCING
STANDARDS (SECOND), § 2.2 (tent. draft 1979) (approved at the 1979 Annual
Meeting).
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coercion and cure to produce law-abiding citizens and to deter
others from criminal behavior.
The model also had practical advantages in administering cor-
rectional institutions. The parole release discretion provided a
safety valve for overcrowded prisons. The system also allowed
sentencing courts to impart relatively long sentences to satisfy
public opinion while allowing the parole board to award early re-
lease to keep sentences within reasonable limits.
Recent examinations of the results of the sentencing system
have called into question both its practical effectiveness and its
theoretical justification.4 4 The thrust of the criticisms has been
three-fold: 1) the current system does not allow effective use of
deterrence principles and yet it neither rehabilitates offenders nor
isolates offenders likely to commit future crimes; 45 2) the current
system results in large scale disparity in sentences creating frus-
trations, tensions, and disrespect for the system in both the offend-
ers and the public-at-large;46 and 3) the current system is
philosophically unjust in that it oftentimes severs the relationship
between the punishment imposed and the offense committed.47
The provisions of Article 3 reflect the use of "just deserts" as
the overriding philosophy justifying the imposition of criminal
sanctions. This philosophy requires that the nature and severity of
the sanction imposed be deserved on the basis of the offense com-
mitted and certain limited mitigating and aggravating factors relat-
ing to the offense and the offender. This seeks to avoid the
injustice that results from utilizing the other traditional purposes
of punishment.
The use of rehabilitation as a relevant factor in sentencing has
been accused of causing substantial disparity in sentencing:
[I]f rehabilitation is the goal, and persons differ in their capacity to be
rehabilitated, then two persons who have committed precisely the same
crime under precisely the same circumstances might receive very differ-
ent sentences, thereby violating the offenders' and our sense of jus-
tice .... Rigorously applied on the basis of existing evidence about what
44. For arguments and proposals for change reflecting the primary theoretical
basis for the philosophy embodied in Article 3, see AmERCAN FRmENDS SERV-
ICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971); CITIZENS' INQUIRY ON PAROLE
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PRISONS WITHOUT WALLS (1975); D. Fogel, supra note
6; M. FRANKEL, supra note 6; D. LIPrON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKs, THE EFFEc-
TIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT (1975); N. MoRIs, supra note 6;
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 6; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 6; Harris,
Disquisition on the Need for a New Model for Criminal Sanctioning Systems,
77 W. VA. L. REv. 263 (1975); McGee, A New Look at Sentencing (pts. 1-2),
FED. PROBATION, June 1974, at 3 and Sept. 1974, at 3.




factors are associated with recidivism, this theory would mean that if two
persons together rob a liquor store, the one who is a young black male
from a broken family, with little education and a record of drug abuse, will
be kept in prison indefinitely, while an older white male from an intact
family, with a high school diploma and no drug experience, will be re-
leased almost immediately. Not only the young black male, but most fair-
minded observers, would regard that outcome as profoundly unjust.4 8
Recent studies have also called into question the effectiveness
of coerced rehabilitation programs.4 9 Moreover, the rigidly struc-
tured environment of a prison does not provide a suitable educa-
tional experience for learning how to exist in a free society.5 o And
even if rehabilitation worked, the justification for extending a sen-
tence for rehabilitative purposes, beyond what was "deserved" for
the offense committed, breaks the tie between offense and sanc-
tion, thus removing the offense as the justification for intervention
into the life of the offender. The full implication of governmental
intervention into the lives of its citizens unrelated to commission
of a criminal offense runs counter to the traditional and related val-
ues of individual freedom and limited governmental power.
The abandonment of rehabilitation as a factor in determining
the nature or length of a sentence does not abandon rehabilitation
as a goal of the correctional system. Rather, within the just-
deserts sentence imposed, the Act requires that offenders be pro-
vided with programs and services to better themselves.5 1 Thus,
the Act permits offenders to choose whether and in what programs
they will participate.
Another traditional goal of punishment has been to restrain or
incapacitate those offenders predicted as likely to commit future
crimes. This goal has been implemented for the most part through
the parole system in which the parole board is authorized to re-
lease offenders from confinement when they are no longer danger-
ous or have been rehabilitated. In addition many systems provide
enhanced sentences for those predicted to be dangerous. Al-
though the theory of the system is plausible, in practice attempts
to predict dangerousness have not been successful. The
knowledge necessary to predict who will commit future crimes is
undeveloped. As Professor von Hirsch noted: "With a predictive
instrument of so little discernment and a target population so
small, the forecaster will be able to spot a significant percentage of
the actual violators only if a large number offalse positives is also
included."52 This results in the unnecessary confinement of many
48. J. WILSON, THINKING AnouT CRIME 171 (1975).
49. E.g., D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WINKS, supra note 44.
50. See D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM (1964).
51. See text accompanying notes 75-76, 106 infra.
52. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 6, at 22 (emphasis in original).
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offenders in order to isolate a few who are dangerous. The unrelia-
bility of our methods of prediction and the tendency to greatly
overpredict likely recidivism suggests that predictive restraint
should not be used to determine the nature or severity of the sanc-
tion imposed.
Within the liniftations of the deserved punishment, deterrence
of others is an appropriate goal to pursue. The present system
largely relies for deterrent effect on the existence of an undifferen-
tiated criminal sanction. Our knowledge and ability to fine tune
the sentencing system for deterrence purposes is not well devel-
oped.53 In part, this results from the individualized treatment
model which prevents any informed knowledge of criminal sanc-
tions from being imparted to the public. The deterrence impact of
a legislative increase in a sentence for a particular offense is
largely muted by the discretionary sentencing practices of courts
and parole boards.
Discretionary release systems like parole also have counter-
productive effects on the lives and attitudes of offenders. Persons
subject to a parole board's discretion inevitably participate in a
"con game" to convince the board they are ready for release. In
addition, the uncertain nature of the sentence prohibits careful
planning for release. Perhaps more important, however, the parole
system intensifies disparity in sentences. This, in turn, creates
tension and hostility within correctional institutions and thus
makes actual rehabilitation more difficult.
Perhaps the major indictment of the current system is that it
has lost public confidence. The sentencing system purports to do
more than it can deliver-it claims to rehabilitate, isolate, and de-
ter and thus attracts the blame for publicized crimes by ex-offend-
ers and for the perceived increase in crime generally. The
provisions of Article 3 attempt to speak to the concerns expressed
with current sentencing provisions.5 4 They are directed by the
53. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE (1973).
54. The acceptance of the need for basic systematic change in criminal sentenc-
ing is reflected in current legislative responses. Indiana and Maine have
enacted flat sentencing systems by eliminating parole in most instances. IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-2-4 to -7 (Burns 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A.,
§§ 1253, 1254. California has both enacted a presumptive sentencing system
and abolished discretionary release. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170 to 1170.6 (West
Supp. 1979). The Federal Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976,
18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-218 (1976), made mandatory an earlier administrative deci-
sion to establish presumptive parole dates for federal prisoners. Further,
state legislatures are considering various forms of presumptive and flat sen-
tencing proposals in, among others, Minnesota, Illinois, Ohio, Alaska and
New Jersey. In addition to such legislative responses, several courts are ex-
perimenting with sentencing guidelines. See L. WnHaNs, J. KRESS, D. GOTF-
FREDSON, J. CALPIN & A. GELMAN, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING
JUDICIAL DISCRETION (1976).
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overriding attempt to reduce injustice and to implement a modest,
attainable system of sentencing criminal offenders. 55
1. Overview of Article 3
Part 1 of Article 3 establishes the general framework for
sentencing. The purposes and principles of sentencing are
articulated in sections 3-10156 and 3-10257 of the Act. Section
55. This goal is also reflected in the modified flat sentencing plan approved by the
ABA Joint Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners. ABA JoiNT COMM.,
supra note 16, § 9.1.
56. MSCA § 3-101 [Purposes].
The purposes of the Article are to:
(1) punish a criminal defendant by assuring the imposition of a
sentence he deserves in relation to the seriousness of his offense;(2) assure the fair treatment of all defendants by eliminating un-
justified disparity in sentences, providing fair warning of the nature
of the sentence to be imposed, and establishing fair procedures for
the imposition of sentences; and(3) prevent crime and promote respect for law by,
(i) providing an effective deterrent to others likely to
commit similar offenses;
(ii) restraining defendants with a long history of criminal
conduct; and
(iii) promoting correctional programs that elicit the volun-
tary cooperation and participation of offenders.
57. MSCA § 3-102 [Principles of Sentencing].
To implement the purposes of this Article the following principles
apply.
(1) The sentence imposed should be no greater than that de-
served for the offense committed.
(2) Inequalities in sentences that are unrelated to a purpose of
this Article should be avoided.
(3) The sentence imposed should be the least severe measure
necessary to achieve the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.
(4) Sentences not involving confinement should be preferred
unless:
(i) confinement is necessary to protect society by
restraining a defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct;
(i) confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the
seriousness of the offense or justly to punish the defendant;
(iii) confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective
deterrent to others likely to commit similar offenses;(iv) measures less restrictive than confinement have fre-
quently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant; or
(v) the purposes of this Article would be fulfilled only by a
sentence involving confinement.
(5) The potential or lack of potential for the rehabilitation or
treatment of the defendant should not be considered in determining
the sentence alternative or length of term to be imposed, but the
length of a term of community supervision may reflect the length of a
treatment or rehabilitation program in which participation is a condi-
tion of the sentence.
(6) The prediction of the potential for future criminality by a
particular defendant, unless based on prior criminal conduct or acts
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3-10358 describes the sentencing alternatives, and the maximum
possible sentences for categories of offenses are established in
Section 3-104.
A Sentencing Commission is created 59 to develop sentencing
guidelines. 60 Once created, these guidelines viill provide the pre-
sumptively appropriate sentence to be imposed in each case based
on statutorily authorized factors relating to the offender and the
severity of the offense.61 The guidelines will indicate the appropri-
ate type of sentence, i.e., fine, community supervision, periodic
confinement, continuous confinement, as well as the length or
magnitude of the sentence to be imposed.62
Part 2 of the Article establishes the procedures for imposing
sentences. A presentence report is required in all felony cases, 63
but the court may order a shortened report where there are no con-
designated as a crime under the law, should not be considered in de-
termining his sentence alternative or the length of term to be im-
posed.
58. MSCA § 3-103 [Sentencing Alternatives].
(a) A person convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor in this
State must be sentenced in accordance with this Act.
(b) The following sentencing alternatives are authorized:
(1) payment of a fine either alone or in addition to any other
sentence authorized by this subsection;
(2) service of a term of community supervision;
(3) service of a split sentence of confinement followed by a
term of community supervision;
(4) service of a term of periodic confinement;
(5) service of a term of continuous confinement;
(6) making restitution alone or in addition to any other sen-
tence authorized by this subsection.
(c) This Article does not deprive a court of any authority con-
ferred by law to decree a forfeiture of property, suspend or cancel a
license, remove a person from office, or impose costs and other mone-
tary obligations if specifically authorized by law.
[ (d) This Article does not prevent a court from imposing a sen-
tence of death specifically authorized by law.]
59. MSCA § 3-110 [Sentencing Commission; Creation]. Locating in an adminis-
trative agency the obligation to develop presumptive sentences provides
greater flexibility in the development and modification of sentences and as-
sures continuing examination of sentencing practices.
60. MSCA § 3-112 [Duties of Sentencing Commission].
61. MSCA § 3-115 [Sentencing Guideline; Requirements]. The guidelines must
be consistent with the purposes (MSCA § 3-101) and principles (MSCA § 3-
102) of sentencing.
62. MSCA §§ 3-113 [Sentencing Guidelines; Non-Monetary Sentencing Alterna-
tives] and 3-114 [Monetary and Non-Monetary Conditions of Sentencing
Guidelines].
63. MSCA § 3-203 [Presentence Investigation and Report]. The court may order
preparation of a presentence report in misdemeanor cases and, with the de-
fendant's agreement, a presentence investigation may begin before adjudica-
tion of guilt. The report includes any victim's statement with respect to
sentencing.
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tested issues of mitigation or aggravation. 64 A sentencing hearing
is required.65 The sentencing court is obligated to impose the
guideline sentence unless it finds that some other sentence would
better serve the purposes and principles of sentencing.66 If the
court departs from the guidelines it must also enter on the record
its reasons for so departing.67 Finally, appellate review of
sentences is authorized.68
Parts 3 through 6 of the Article provide statutory detail for the
various types of sentences authorized by the Act. Part 3 imple-
ments sentences to community supervision. The Act uses the
term "community supervision" as a substitute for what has tradi-
tionally been called "probation" and which refers to supervision in
the community under conditions imposed by the court. Part 4 re-
lates to fines.
Part 5 provides for the elements of a sentence to confinement.
Three sentences involving confinement are authorized: split
sentences, periodic confinement, and continuous confinement.
Split sentences involve confinement for not more than 180 days fol-
lowed by a term of community supervision. 69 Periodic confine-
ment involves confinement only during specified days or parts of
days and supervision in the community at other times.70 A sen-
tence for continuous confinement requires the offender to serve
his entire sentence in a facility. There is no parole or other discre-
tionary release, but each offender earns one day of good time for
each day he serves in confinement without violating prison rules.7 '
Good time credits are awarded neither for program participation
nor on the basis of official judgments regarding rehabilitative pro-
gress; their forfeiture may be assessed as punishment in a discipli-
nary proceeding.7 2 No supervision is provided after release from
64. MSCA § 3-204 [Requirements of Presentence Reports].
65. MSCA § 3-206 [Sentencing Hearing]. The victim is afforded the opportunity
to be heard at the hearing.
66. MSCA § 3-207 [Imposition of Sentence]. The requirement that the court
show a sentence that deviates from the guidelines is better, not just appropri-
ate, places a substantial burden on the sentencing judge if he does not im-
pose the guideline sentence.
67. Id. An articulation of reasons makes appellate review more practical.
68. MSCA § 3-208 [Appellate Review of Sentences]. Appellate review may be
sought by either the defendant or prosecutor and the appellate court may
increase as well as reduce the sentence imposed.
69. MSCA § 3-503 [Split Sentence]. Split sentences are subject to good time re-
ductions. Id. § 3-501(c). Thus, the 180-day maximum reflects a 90-day maxi-
mum of "real" time. Id. § 3-501(b).
70. MSCA § 3-504 [Periodic Confinement; Effect].
71. MSCA § 3-501 [Sentences to Confinement; Good Time Reductions].
72. MSCA § 4-502 [Punishments for Disciplinary Infractions]. Good time reduc-
tions of the sentence imposed are common in statutory schemes. E.g., NEB.
REV. STAT. § 83-1,107 (Reissue 1976). In many jurisdictions good time is auto-
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confinement, but the department is authorized to provide services
and assistance to released offenders on a voluntary basis and to
make funds available to them conditioned on their participation in
post-release programs.7 3 Part 6 authorizes the grant of restitution
to victims.
C. Treatment of Offenders and Judicial Oversight-Article 4
Article 4 of the Model Act for the most part governs the treat-
ment of those persons convicted of and sentenced for criminal con-
duct. It describes a system that protects the interests of confined
persons, one in which such individuals are allowed to learn to ac-
cept the responsibilities of life in free society by being subjected to
the same system of incentives and burdens experienced by free
citizens. The article is built upon the basic premise that persons in
the custody of the department have the right to be treated fairly.
In part, support for the premise is philosophical-that the great-
ness of a society can be measured by the way it treats criminal
offenders. In part, support for the premise is utilitarian-that fair
treatment is a prerequisite for rehabilitation. In part, support for
the premise is legal-that offenders are entitled under the Consti-
tution to basic elements of fair treatment. Finally, in part, support
for the premise is traditional-that governmental power should al-
ways be restrained, not necessarily because of proven abuse but
because of the potential for abuse.
The withdrawal of liberty inherent in imprisonment or other
less intrusive criminal sanctions is punishment. The provisions of
the Model Act, particularly those of Article 4, reflect a refusal to
add to the magnitude of that punishment by creating or maintain-
ing harsh or insensitive correctional facilities or programs.7 4
Rather, the Act creates a correctional environment approximating
life outside the prison, with confined persons treated with dignity
and as functioning adults capable of making and accepting respon-
sibility for their own decisions. Reducing the pervasiveness of ad-
ministrative control over the lives of confined persons is not wholly
matically credited and may be forfeited only upon the commission of a disci-
plinary infraction. Id. Under the Model Act good time forfeiture may be
imposed only if the disciplinary infraction is a felony or seriously jeopardizes
safety or the confined person is a frequent rule violator. MSCA § 4-502. Gen-
erally a forfeiture of 90 days good time is the maximum that may be imposed
for any one disciplinary infraction. Id.
73. MSCA §§ 3-507 [Pre-release and Post-release Programs]; 3-508 [Release of
Confined Persons]; and 3-509 [Released Offender Loan Fund].
74. See generally ABA JoinT Com., supra note 16; S. KRANZ, R. BELL, J. BRANT &
M. MAGRUDER, MODEL RULES AND REGULATIONS ON PRISONERS' RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 1-4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES]; NAC, supra
note 3, at 17-21.
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an act of mercy; it is also a calculated act of self-protection that
may be the most reasonable and efficient means to decrease
recidivism, 7 5 since:
[viirtually all prisoners will some day be released to a society in which
... they will daily be required to make choices and exercise self-restraint.
If our institutions of confinement do not replace self-restraint for com-
pelled restraint, and encourage choice rather than rote obedience, re-
leased prisoners will continue to be unable to deal with the "real" world.
7 6
Article 4 represents a detailed codification of those interests of
confined persons which ought to be protected. At the same time
these "protected interests" are balanced against the legitimate in-
terest of the public in assuring that the correctional system is ad-
ministered in an orderly fashion, providing adequate security and
safety to the public. This balancing is performed in two ways.
First, a general provision stipulates the extent to which any "pro-
tected interest" of a confined person may be justifiably limited.
Second, the details of each protected interest are specifically es-
tablished, as reproduced below:
Section 4-10277
(a) Whenever this Act specifically provides a confined person with a
"protected interest," the director shall take appropriate measures to pre-
serve and facilitate the full realization of that interest.
(b) The director may suspend or limit the realization of a protected
interest otherwise provided by this Act during an emergency in a facility
or part of a facility if the director finds that unusual conditions exist in a
facility that imminently jeopardize the safety of the public or the security
or safety within a facility and that extreme measures are necessary. The
director shall rescind the suspension as soon as the emergency is over
and, within 30 days after the emergency is over, submit to the Governor a
written report describing the nature of the emergency and the measures
taken.
(c) Consistent with the provisions of this Part that specifically re-
quire or prohibit the performance of an act by the director, the director
may adopt measures that:
(1) limit the full realization of a protected interest if the measures
are designed to protect the safety of the public or the security or safety
within a facility; and
(2) regulate the time, place, and manner of the realization of a pro-
tected interest if the measures are designed to assure the orderly adminis-
tration of a facility.
(d) Whenever the director adopts measures pursuant to subsection
(c), they must be:
(1) designed to create no greater restriction on the protected inter-
est than reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose for which they
were adopted; and
(2) adopted in accordance with the procedures established for the
adoption of rules.
75. E.g., ABA JoiNT COMM., supra note 16, at 417-20.
76. Id. at 418-19.
77. MSCA § 4-102 [Protected Interests; General Provisions].
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Subsection (a) of the section establishes an obligation on the
Director of Corrections to take affirmative steps to assist confined
persons to realize their protected interests. This reflects a recogni-
tion of the realities of prison life, where all control initially rests
with the administration. Subsection (b) authorizes the suspen-
sion of protected interests during an emergency. Subsection (c)
provides the major balancing of interests. Protected interests, spe-
cifically delineated in later sections of Article 4, can be limited if
necessary "to protect the safety of the public or the security or
safety within a facility"--a phrase used throughout the Act. The
interest in orderly administration of a facility is not as imperative
as security and safety and thus does not serve to justify limiting
realization of protected interests except as to time, place and man-
ner. The director's authority under this subsection is further cir-
cumscribed by specific directives and prohibitions contained in
those sections establishing the protected interests.
Underlying the delineation of protected interests of confined
persons is the philosophy adopted in several cases that "[a] pris-
oner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those ex-
pressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law. '78
The Special Committee recognized, on the other hand, that facility
administrators must retain some discretion, particularly regarding
matters of detail that do not raise significant issues of fair treat-
78. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) (per curiam). Accord,
Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 553-54 (W.D. Wis. 1972). See CAT. PENAL
CODE § 2601 (West Supp. 1979).
To the extent the test described in the Model Act imposes the burden on
correctional officials to justify their acts or regulations it has been rejected as
a constitutional requirement by the United States Supreme Court in a case
involving pretrial detainees. Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979), rev'g, Wolf-
ish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'g in part, United States ex reL Wolf-
ish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Both the district court and the
Second Circuit had adopted a test, similar to that of the Model Act, that re-
quired a showing that deprivations imposed on pretrial detainees were justi-
fied by "compelling necessities of jail administration." 573 F.2d at 124
(quoting Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974)). The Supreme
Court adopted instead a requirement that the offender show by substantial
evidence that the challenged administrative practice was excessive or arbi-
trary.
Wolfish was decided after adoption of the Model Act. However, as with
other provisions in the Act, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws viewed constitutional requirements as minima and not
necessarily as limiting the legislative perogative to direct the extent to which
a correctional system might appropriately concern itself with administrative
fairness. Cf. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union Inc., 433 U.S.
119, 136-37 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (federal courts should not second
guess the decisions of legislators and prison officials. Instead, the needed re-
forms must come from those with the most experience in the field, i.e., prison
administrators).
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ment. Each protected interest was described in order to: (1) as-
sure minimum standards of fair treatment for offenders, (2)
facilitate operation of facilities in a way that would afford confined
persons protection beyond minimum standards, and (3) guard
against the potential of administrative abuse. Each articulation of
a protected interest was evaluated by asking two questions: (1)
does it provide the specificity necessary to establish clear guide-
lines for operation; and (2) does it allow room for the administrator
to take account of other legitimate institutional needs? Of course
the interests of security and safety are always considered para-
mount institutional needs if it is demonstrated that they are legiti-
mately involved.
The most significant rights specified in Article 4 are those re-
flecting the basic needs of medical care,7 9 legal assistance,80
healthy and safe living conditions, 8 1 and those relating to the com-
munications rights of confined persons.82 Medical care and a safe
living environment are fundamental rights of the human condition;
their specification is necessary because of the unfortunate history
of many of our correctional institutions, a history that has com-
pelled courts to close facilities because living conditions were
found to be cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth
amendment.83 The communication rights, as exemplified in mail
and visitation rights, permit a confined person to keep in touch
with the outside world. This is important because it leads to the
confined person's better adjustment to prison life as well as to his
better readjustment to life outside.84 Keeping in touch and thus
maintaining ties with the outside world is thought to be an ex-
tremely important factor in preventing recidivism.85 The right to
legal assistance is basic to assure that other rights specified in the
act are protected.
79. MSCA § 4-105 [Medical Care].
80. MSCA § 4-108 [Legal Assistance]. See MSCA §§ 4-109 [Participating in the
Legal Process] and 4-110 [Access to Legal Materials]. See also Potuto, The
Right of Prisoner Access: Does Bounds Have Bounds?, 53 IND. L.J. 207 (1978).
81. MSCA §§ 4-104 [Physical Security] and 4-106 [Right to Healthful Environ-
ment]. See MSCA § 4-107 [Physical exercise].
82. Communication rights include communication by whatever manner-mail,
telephone, face-to-face through visitation, etc., as well as the ability to be kept
apprised of the outside world through books, magazines and television. See
MSCA §§ 4-114 [Communications], 4-115 [Visitation], 4-123 [Lending Library;
Reading Material; Radio and Television], and 4-124 [Facility News Medium].
83. See, e.g., Puch v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976). See also note 21
supra.
84. ASSOCIATION OF STATE CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATORS, PoLicY GUIDELINES
(1972); Fox, The First Amendment Rights of Prisoners, 63 J. CRuvi. L.C. & P.S.,
162, 173-74 (1972).
85. See, e.g., N. HOLT & D. MILLER, EXPLORATIONS IN INMATE-FAMILY RELATION-
SHIPS (1972); N. MORRIS, supra note 6.
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A careful analysis of Section 4-114 (dealing with oral and writ-
ten communications) and its relationship to other sections, may
help clarify the way in which a balance is struck between the exer-
cise by a confined person of a right specifically afforded him under
the Act, in this instance, communications, and the interests of se-
curity, safety, and orderly administration, which are also pre-
served.
Section 4-11486
(a) A confined person has a protected interest in communicating pri-
vately with other persons by means of oral and written communication.
(b) The director shall:
(1) provide, at the department's expense, to each confined person
a reasonable amount of stationary and writing implements;
(2) promptly transmit, at the department's expense,
(i) all written communications from a confined person to
his attorney, the director, the correctional mediator, or any federal or state
court having jurisdiction over a legal matter in which he is involved;
(ii) a reasonable number of written communications
from a confined person to the Governor and members of the [Legislature];
(iii) up to 5 additional one-ounce written communications
per week from the confined person to other persons; and
(iv) all written communications delivered to the facility
and addressed to the confined person; and
(3) provide confined persons with access to telephones and permit
a confined person to place and receive emergency telephone calls and
those to or from his attorney.
(c) The director may not:
(1) limit the number of written communications that may be sent
by a confined person at his own expense or received by him;
(2) limit the persons with whom a confined person exchanges
written communications except pursuant to section 4-118; or
(3) limit to less than 2 the number of 3-minute nonemergency tele-
phone calls a confined person may place weekly at his own expense.
(d) Notwithstanding subsection (c), if a confined person sends more
than 10 written communications per week beyond those sent at the de-
partment's expense or a confined person receives inore than 10 written
communications per week in response to any act of the confined person
designed to result in a large number of written correspondence, the direc-
tor may require the confined person to pay the costs of processing the ad-
ditional correspondence.
8 7
Pursuant to this section, a confined person is entitled to at least
two telephone calls weekly and, subject to specified limitations,
may also have unlimited correspondence at his own expense with
anyone with whom he chooses to communicate; "approved" corre-
spondents lists are, therefore, rejected.88 The confined person is
86. MSCA § 4-114 [Communications].
87. Id.
88. Several authorities recommend providing a right to send and receive letters
from or to any person. E.g., AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION COMMIS-
SION ON ACCREDITATION STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITuTIONS
4305, 4341 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ACA STD.]; ABA JOnT CoMM., supra
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also assured correspondence at public expense both to guarantee
him [ (b) (2) (iii) I some access to the outside world 89 and to guar-
antee him access for particularly important purposes 90 [ (b) (2) (i)
and (ii) 1. The thrust of the section is, therefore, far-reaching. On
the other hand, the specification of "reasonable" as to the amount
of stationery to be provided 9 ' [ (b) (1) ] and as to written communi-
cations to the Governor and members of the legislature92 [ (b) (2)
(ii) ], as well as the inclusion of subsection (d) in its entirety, were
thought necessary to assure orderly administration of the facility.
These provisions, in other words, permit correctional administra-
tors to protect against abuse of communication rights by confined
persons.
Subsection (d) also illustrates another approach used through-
out the act. Under current practices it is widely perceived that
many confined persons abuse the rights accorded them. Providing
legal assistance or access to courts will result in frivolous as well
as meretorious law suits. This results from the fact that the exer-
cise of their rights often costs confined persons nothing since their
opportunity for alternative activities is virtually nonexistent. As
long as they are deprived of sources of income, a policy of direct
monetary charges comparable to free world conditions is unsuita-
ble. Thus, the Model Act attempts to provide to each confined per-
son a realistic opportunity to earn money in order to duplicate, to
the extent possible, real-world conditions within facilities. Con-
fined persons are then obligated to pay for the exercise of interests
that go beyond those minimum standards to which each confined
person is entitled.
The section also provides93 [ (c) (2) ] that there may be no limi-
tation on the persons with whom a confined person may corre-
spond except pursuant to Section 4-118. Section 4-118 permits such
limitation when the correspondant knowingly violates institutional
correspondence rules and interceptions of communications are not
feasible.94
note 16, § 6.1; MODEL RULES, supra note 74, at 46 (Rule IC-1); NAC, supra note
3, at 66-69 (Standard 2.17). Several departments of corrections have adopted
such a policy. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 1003-7-2(d) (Smith-Hurd 1973); Ill.
Correc. Ad. Reg., Adult Div'n, § 823 (1975).
89. Several departments of corrections presently provide free mailing. E.g., Man-
ual for Alaska St. Adult Corrections Inst., § 705 (1972); Ad. Plan Manual, N.J.
Div. of Corrections and Parole Standards 291.277 (1975); Pennsylvania Bu-
reau of Corrections Ad. Directive BC-ADM 803 (1972).




94. MSCA § 4-118 [Limiting Visitors and Correspondents].
(a) The director may issue an order that:
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Another example of the attention paid to the safety and secur-
ity factors in the delineation of communication interests is Section
4-117 (Searches and Interception of Communications).95
Section 4-11796
(a) The director may authorize the opening and search for contra-
band or prohibited material of an envelope, package, or container sent to
or by a confined person. This subsection does not authorize the intercep-
tion of written communications.
(b) The director may permit the interception of communications:
(1) upon reliable information that a particular communication may
jeopardize the safety of the public or security or safety within a facility;
(2) in pursuance of a plan formulated by the chief executive officer
of each facility for conducting random interception of communications by
or to confined persons which plan must be approved by the director as
providing the least intrusive invasion of privacy necessary to the safety of
the public and security and safety within a facility; or
(3) when otherwise authorized by law.
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), a communication may not be in-
tercepted except pursuant to a court order or unless authorized by law if
the communication is one which reasonably should be anticipated to be:
(1) a privileged communication between a confined person and his
attorney, clergyman, or physician; or
(2) between a confined person and the Governor, Attorney-Gen-
(1) prevents a specific person from communicating with a
confined person if,
(i) the person seeking to communicate with a confined
person knowingly has violated the rules relating to communication
with confined persons, and
(ii) less restrictive measures, such as intercepting com-
munications between the person and confined persons, are not feasi-
ble.
(2) prevents a specific person from entering facilities or visit-
ing confined persons if,
(i) the person has in the past knowingly violated the
rules of a facility relating to visitation; or
(ii) the director has reliable information that if admitted
to the facility, the person is likely to advocate unlawful acts or rule
violations that jeopardize the safety of the public or security or
safety within a facility.
(b) A person against whom an order is issued is entitled to a
written statement of the basis for the order, an opportunity to contest
the order at a hearing before the director or his delegate, and judicial
review.
(c) A confined person affected by an order issued pursuant to
this section must be informed in writing of the order, the person
against whom it is issued, and the specific reason for the order.
(d) An order pursuant to this section may not continue for more
than 180 days without further evaluation.
95. MSCA § 4-117. Searches of correspondence are treated separately from
searches of persons and physical facilities. For provisions governing the lat-
ter, see MSCA § 4-119 [Searches]. For a provision requiring notice and dis-
closure of all searches, see MSCA § 4-120 [Searches and Interceptions; Notice
and Disclosure].
96. MSCA § 4-117 [Searches and Interceptions of Communications].
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eral, members of the [Legislature], a member of the state judiciary, a
member of the advisory committee, or a member of the sentencing com-
mission.
(d) Whenever the director is authorized by this Act to prevent a per-
son from communicating with a confined person, the director, in lieu
thereof, may authorize communications between the persons to be inter-
cepted if both parties agree to the interception.
(e) The chief executive officer shall designate specifically employees
authorized to intercept communications.
(f) If a written communication is intercepted, it thereafter shall be
transmitted promptly to its addressee unless to do so would jeopardize
the safety of the public or the security or safety within a facility. Only that
part of the communication which jeopardizes the safety of the public or
the security or safety within the facility may be excised.
(g) The director shall maintain a record of each interception or exci-
sion of a communication which includes the date of its occurrence, the
content thereof, the person authorizing the interception or excision and
the factual basis for his doing so, and the name of the confined person
involved.
9 7
As in Section 4-114, this section strikes a balance between insti-
tutional security and the confined person's interest in the privacy
of his communications. 98 The balance struck in this section pro-
tects communication rights beyond a constitutional minimum. 9 9
This is, of course, consistent with the Act's general approach to the
treatment of confined persons, i.e., to restrict the exercise of their
rights and responsibilities as free citizens only when a provable
conflict exists between the exercise of these rights and legitimate
institutional interests. Furthermore, thesb restrictions are author-
ized only to the extent necessary to protect legitimate institutional
interests.
Recognition and acceptance of the Act's general philosophy
however, did not always guarantee uniform Committee sentiment
with respect to the embodiment of this philosophy in specific draft
language. Section 4-117, for example, while admittedly describing
a standard beyond the constitutional minimum, does not go as far
as several authorities recommend. These authorities believe that a
confined person may exercise a much broader right than that af-
forded in this section without unduly affecting institutional secur-
97. Id.
98. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) ("the limitation of First
Amendment freedoms [while incarcerated] must be no greater than is neces-
sary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest in-
volved.").
99. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974) (state conceded it could not read attorney mail); Denson v.
United States, 424 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
844 (1970); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd sub
nom., Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
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ity interests.10 0 The Special Committee was aware of this position
and discussed the particular provisions of this section and their
relationship to the Act's general philosophy. There was doubt ex-
pressed as to whether outgoing communications could ever suffi-
ciently implicate security or safety within the facility. There was
also discussion as to whether, even if in isolated circumstances
outgoing communications could affect security and safety, inter-
cepting these outgoing communications represented a proper bal-
ance between security and safety interests when measured
against: (1) the invasion of privacy inherent in intercepting com-
munications; (2) the potential interference with the benefits de-
rived by society and confined persons when confined persons keep
in touch with family and friends in the free community; and (3) the
administrative costs of a policy of intercepting outgoing communi-
cations.
An administrative decision to intercept outgoing communica-
tions requires the commitment of employee time and departmen-
tal funds. In fact, one explanation for the traditional limit by
correctional authorities on the amount of prisoner correspondence
is that the number of employee hours necessary to intercept all
communications proved too expensive unless the number of com-
munications were limited. The Special Committee ultimately de-
cided that, since the Model Act expressly prohibits limitations on
the number of communications (with the exception of the situa-
tion delineated in Section 4-114(d)) the proper balance between
security needs and the interests of privacy would best be left to
administrative discretion.
A review of the substantive provisions discussed with reference
to Section 4-114 demonstrates a common approach taken through-
out Article 4. In order to secure the fullest exercise of rights con-
sistent with security and safety, the provisions are drafted to grant
the right, or protected interest, in broad terms (e.g., Section 4-114)
and then to specify the standard by which a restriction of the right
is authorized (e.g., Section 4-118).101 This approach places the bur-
den on correctional administrators to justify restrictions of pro-
tected interests as necessary to assure security, safety, or orderly
administration. It also requires them to show that the action taken
is the least restrictive of the protected interest involved. Such a
burden is appropriately placed on administrators given the signifi-
cance of protected interests to confined persons, the potential con-
100. E.g., ACA STD., supra note 88, at 4343; ABA JoImT Comm., supra note 16, § 6.1;
MODEL RULES, supra note 74, at 46-47 (Rule IC-1 to -2).
101. This approach can also be seen within each section. For example, Section 4-
114, as indicated, grants a broad right of communication to confined persons.
Yet it also contains internal limitations on that right.
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stitutional imperatives underlying many of the interests protected,
and the access of correctional authority to the information neces-
sary to prove the justification for restricting protected interests.
The structure of the Act facilitates meaningful judicial review of
administrative action since it provides an articulated standard by
which a court may evaluate administrative acts and decisions. It
permits the rule of law to enter the closed door of the facility and
assure itself that a fair and just system operates therein. Judicial
review was provided not because it was felt that, otherwise, facili-
ties would be administered poorly, evilly, or corruptly, but be-
cause, as was said in a related context, "to exclude any particular
police activity from [judicial] coverage is essentially to exclude it
from judicial control and from the command of reasonableness,
whereas to include it is to do no more than say that it must be
conducted in a reasonable manner."102
In order to achieve the goal of making prison life an approxima-
tion of life outside the walls, confined persons should be involved
in decision-making processes concerning them. Thus, the Act pro-
vides a voucher program designed to allow confined persons to as-
sume responsibility for selecting rehabilitative or educational
programs for themselves. 10 3 It establishes grievance committees
consisting of equal numbers of correctional employees and per-
sons in the custody of the department. 104 It also protects a con-
fined person's right to refuse to participate in educational,
rehabilitative, recreational, or other "treatment" programs. 0 5 The
policy choices reflected throughout the Act are to provide ample
opportunities for confined-person self-improvement and to permit
confined persons to decide for themselves in what programs, if
any, they will participate. The attempt is to construct monetary or
other free world incentives for participation in work and training
rather than to force participation. 0 6 This policy choice is by no
means a denigration of the positive benefits of participation in
work, training, or other rehabilitative programs. It reflects, rather,
the belief that forced rehabilitation creates resentment and is
rarely productive of long-lasting results.107
102. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 363-
64 (1974).
103. MSCA §§ 4-701 to -706.
104. MSCA §4-302 [Grievance Committees; Creation]. Requiring an equal
number of employees and confined persons prevents participants from
merely relying on power voting. These committees are one alternative griev-
ance mechanism; the director is authorized to create others. MSCA §§ 4-301
to -307.
105. MSCA § 4-126.
106. MSCA §§ 4-801 to -816.
107. E.g., D. LIPON, R. MARTINSON & J. WINKS, supra note 44.
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The major exception to this approach is found in Section 4-808
(Required Work).
Section 4-808108
(a) A confined person may be required to keep his own living
quarters clean and orderly.
(b) A confined offender may be required to perform general mainte-
nance work in the facility and assist in providing other services essential
to the administration of the facility such as food and laundry service.
(c) A confined offender may be required to work in a business, com-
mercial, industrial, or agricultural enterprise operated by the department.
Gainful employment, of course, may be seen as a benefit to a
confined person. Thus a right to refuse employment would be con-
sistent with the policy choice throughout the Act that permits a
confined person to refuse opportunities that benefit him. The deci-
sion to require confined persons to work, although seemingly in-
consistent with this basic policy, reflects a decision reached by the
Special Committee after much debate. The section was retained
for two reasons. Some committee members felt that the benefits
derived from employment by the confined offender and society
may outweigh other interests and others felt that required work
can be expected by a society' 09 otherwise obligated to provide con-
fined persons with the necessities of life.
The incentive for confined persons to better themselves
through gainful employment is a significant underpinning to Arti-
cle 4. There is a clear relationship between recidivism and the in-
ability, upon release, to find and retain employment." 0
Developing adequate employment skills and habits upon release is
a major priority of the Model Act and should be the goal of any
correctional system."' However, in a 1974 study it was found that
only four percent of all persons confined in state and federal facili-
ties were participants in a work-release program while only eleven
percent worked in prison industries." 2 Moreover, it has been
noted that in the typical prison industry shop today "idleness,
make-believe work, short work shifts, work interruptions,
overmanned shops, and obsolete industrial methods, material and
equipment do not enhance the job acquisition prospects of ex-in-
mate workers.""13 Part 8 of Article 4, Employment and Training of
108. MSCA § 4-808 [Required Work].
109. See Ericsson, Labor-Market Wages for Prisoners 2 (Dec. 1972).
110. See D. GLASER, supra note 50, at 311-61; 6 ECON, INC., ANALYSIS OF PRISON
INDUSTRIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC
AND REHABILITATIVE ASPECTS OF PRISON INDUSTRY (Sept. 24, 1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ECON, INC.]
ill. E.g., ABA JOINT COMM., supra note 16, §§ 44.1 to .4, and Commentary.
112. Levy, Abrams & Lanow, Final Report on Vocational Preparation in U.S. Cor-
rectional Institutions, iii-iv (U.S. Dep't of Labor 1975).
113. 6 ECON, INC., supra note 110, at 4. See, e.g., NAC, supra note 3, at 583-84
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Confined Persons, generally obligates the director to attempt to
provide vocational training or realistic work experience to all con-
fined persons as well as to assist in job placement upon release." 4
The general objectives reflected in this part are supported, among
others, by the American Correctional Association" 5 and reflect a
decision that work provided confined persons should be: "[NJ ot
busy work, but productive labor with outside world efficiency,
outside world wages, and outside world relevance-having as its
dual objective financial self-sufficiency and success in the reinte-
gration of ex-offenders into society."" 6
The gainful employment to be provided under the Act does not
stop with enterprises operated by the department." 7 Work-re-
lease opportunities are authorized" 8 and, more importantly, there
is authorization for private industry to operate on the property of a
facility and employ confined persons." 9 Consistent with the objec-
tives of Article 4 to approximate life outside the facility, real-world
(Standard 16.13 and Commentary); PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON PRISONER
REHABILITATION, THE CRIMINAL OFFENDER-WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 10
(1970) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON REHABILITATION];
Jensen, Mazze & Miller, Legal Reform of Prison Industries: New Opportuni-
tiesfor Marketing Managers, 12 AM. Bus. L.J. 173, 177 (1974).
114. MSCA § 4-801 [Director's Duties]. These duties include the expansion and
upgrading of employment and vocational training opportunities for confined
persons and assisting them in employment placement after release.
115. ACA STD., supra note 88, at 4386 (sufficient employment opportunities), 4387
(relevant work experience), 4388 (work day similar to free community), 4395
(educational and vocational training opportunities).
116. 6 ECON, INC., supra note 110, at 21. Accord, e.g., ABA JOINT COMM., supra
note 16, §§ 4.1 to .4 and Commentary; Committee on Correctional Facilities
and Services, Georgia State Bar Ass'n, (1975); NAC, supra note 3, at 583-84
(Standard 16.13 and Commentary); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT ON CORRECTIONS, 176
(1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON COaECTIONS]; PRESI-
DENT'S TASK FORCE ON REHABILITATION, supra note 113, at 12; H. BARNES & N.
TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 741-42 (2d ed. 1951).
117. MSCA § 4-809 [Enterprises Operated by the Department]. This section not
only authorizes prison industries but permits the director to use funds gener-
ated by these industries, and other available funds, to, among other things,
expand the size of the industries, increase wages to confined persons, and
establish placement services.
118. MSCA § 4-803 [Employment or Training Outside Facility]. More than half of
the states presently provide work-release opportunities. For a list of these
states see MSCA at 387.
119. MSCA § 4-804 [Private Enterprise on Property of Facility]. This section au-
thorizes the director to lease property to private enterprise so that the enter-
prise may come on the grounds to employ confined persons. In awarding
leases the director must consider:
(1) the nature of the enterprise and its compatibility with the
administration of the facility;
(2) the number of confined persons to be employed;
(3) the nature and prevailing wage for the employment offered
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working conditions and wages are mandated;120 the confined per-
son is also expected to pay room and board and other costs.121 In
fact, the employment provisions of the Act are among the most sig-
nificant in terms of effectuating an approximation of life outside
the facility. 22 As such, they are integral to the operation of the
Act.
The purpose and effect of the employment provisions are more
fully realized in Part 10 of Article 4, Collateral Consequences of
Charge and Conviction. The employment sections are intended to
provide a realistic work environment that instills in confined per-
sons an appreciation for the work ethic and a sense of job responsi-
bility. It would be a mere pyrrhic victory if this goal were
accomplished and yet persons convicted of offenses were unable,
through discrimination or statutory prohibitions, to obtain employ-
ment after discharge from their sentence.123 The collateral conse-
quences provisions are intended to prevent this result by
providing that convicted persons do not suffer loss of civil, per-
and the availability of similar employment opportunities for confined
persons upon release;
(4) the willingness and capability of the private enterprise to
train confined persons for employment in the enterprise;
(5) the financial gain to be derived by the department from the
lease; and
(6) the views of appropriate civic, business, and labor organiza-
tions.
Id. § 4-804(c).
The director is authorized to forgive payments or make payments to a pri-
vate enterprise operating on the property of a facility if the enterprise incurs
costs it would not otherwise incur--costs directly related to the nature and
size of the confined-person work-force or location of the facility. MSCA § 4-
805 [Adjustment for Additional Costs Incurred by Private Enterprise on
Property of Facility].
120. MSCA § 4-811 [Terms and Conditions of Employment]. Until such time as
prison industries generate sufficient funds to support payment of prevailing
wages, however, the director is authorized to base wage payments on the pro-
ductivity of the prison industry employing the confined person.
121. MSCA § 4-812 [Disposition of Wages]. Room and board costs may not exceed
25 percent of the confined person's monthly gross wages less required payroll
deductions. Ten percent of these wages must be deposited for the confined
person and provided to him upon his release.
122. Part 9 of Article 4 also aids in creating an approximation of a free employee's
life since it provides compensation for work-related injuries to confined per-
sons.
123. For example, barbering is one of the trades often taught at correctional facili-
ties. Yet, as of 1976, 47 states required evidence of good moral character
(often read automatically to exclude offenders, or at least felons, from eligi-
bility) and 22 states specifically required no criminal record as a prerequisite
to obtaining a barber's license. ABA Clearinghouse on Offender Employ-
ment Restrictions, Removing Offender Employment Restrictions (March
1976).
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sonal, and political rights 124 and may not be discriminated against
in seeking employment, professional or occupational licenses, or
vocational or professional training unless a direct relationship, as
defined in the Act, exists between the underlying offense and the
job, license, or educational opportunity sought. 125 Several states
now prohibit employment discrimination solely on the basis of a
criminal record.126 And several authorities urge the abolition of li-
censing requirements that act to restrict available employment
124. MSCA § 4-1001 [Rights Retained].
125. MSCA § 4-1005 [Discrimination; Direct Relationship].
(a) This section applies only to acts of discrimination directed at
persons who have been convicted of an offense and discharged from
their sentence.
(b) It is unlawful discrimination, solely by reason of a convic-
tion:
(1) for an employer to discharge, refuse to hire, or otherwise
to discriminate against a person with respect to the compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment. For purposes of
this section, "employer" means this State and its political subdivi-
sions and a private individual or organization [employing 15 or more
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year];
(2) for a trade, vocational, or professional school to suspend,
expel, refuse to admit, or otherwise discriminate against a person;
(3) for a labor organization or other organization in which
membership is a condition of employment or of the practice of an
occupation or profession to exclude or to expel from membership or
otherwise to discriminate against a person; or
(4) for this State or any of its political subdivisions to suspend
or refuse to issue or renew a license, permit, or certificate necessary
to practice or engage in an occupation or profession.
(c) It is not unlawful discrimination to discriminate against a
person because of a conviction if the underlying offense directly re-
lates to the particular occupation, profession, or educational en-
deavor involved. In making the determination of direct relationship
the following factors must be considered:
(1) whether the occupation, profession, or educational en-
deavor provides an opportunity for the commission of similar of-
fenses;
(2) whether the circumstances leading to the offense will re-
cur;
(3) whether the person has committed other offenses since
conviction or his conduct since conviction makes it likely that he will
commit other offenses;
(4) whether the person seeks to establish or maintain a rela-
tionship with an individual or organization with which his victim is
associated or was associated at the time of the offense; and
(5) the time elapsed since release.
(d) [The State Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
has jurisdiction over allegations of violations of this section in a like
manner with its jurisdiction over other allegations of discrimination.]
126. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-61n to -61r (West Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 112.011 (West Supp. Pamphlet 1978); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 378-2 (1976);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.96A.020 (West 1977).
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choices for convicted persons. 127 The collateral consequences pro-
visions round out the Act's employment provisions and make the
goal embodied in the Act more realistic, i.e., that offenders will be
discharged from sentences with attitude and skills that will make
recidivism less likely.
1. Overview of Article 4
Part 1 contains a delineation of the most important protected
interests that are retained by confined persons. They include basic
needs and those rights mandated by courts to be provided to con-
fined persons. They extend beyond these interests, however, to in-
clude free-citizen rights whose extension to confined persons is
consistent with safety and security. By creating the office of cor-
rectional mediator, Part 2 provides one method to relieve tensions
and mediate disputes within facilities. Part 3 requires the adop-
tion of grievance procedures, another method to relieve tensions
and permit a dialogue for change-when change is necessary-
within facilities. Part 4 deals with the assignment, classification
and transfer of persons in the custody of the department. Since
these decisions have a substantial impact on the lives of confined
persons, this part describes procedures by which these decisions
must be made. Part 5 deals with discipline within facilities. It
prescribes a code of presumptive punishments proportionate to
the seriousness of the disciplinary infraction and thus reflects, for
disciplinary matters, the same rationale that underlies the sen-
tencing scheme of the Act. This part also affords procedural pro-
tections to the confined person charged with a disciplinary
infraction. Part 6 deals with programs putting confined persons at
risk. It reflects the belief that informed, confined-person consent is
possible in a correctional setting that eliminates parole, earned
good time, and coerced rehabilitation, and that provides real earn-
ing capacity to confined persons so that they have sources alterna-
tive to experimentation by which to obtain funds. Part 7 provides
for a voucher program. The program is intended to increase the
number and effectiveness of programs offered confined persons
and to encourage confined persons to take full advantage of such
programs by permitting them to choose those programs in which
they will participate. Part 8 provides for the employment of con-
fined persons at "real" wages and in a realistic work environment.
It encourages provision of a full panoply of employment and voca-
tional training opportunities and, in moving towards a goal of full
employment for confined persons, permits employment of con-
127. E.g., ABA JoiNT COMM., supra note 16, §§ 10.1 to .7, and Commentary; NAC,
supra note 3, at 592-93 (Standard 16.17 and Commentary); PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON CORRECTIONS, supra note 116, at 90-91.
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fined persons by private enterprise and payment of competitive
wages. Part 9 deals with compensation for work-related offender
injuries. Part 10 deals with the collateral consequences of a convic-
tion. It acts to restore to an ex-offender those rights abridged by
conviction or confinement and to protect him from employment
discrimination when the employment he seeks is not directly re-
lated to the offense for which he was convicted. The part attempts
to effect a full reintegration of the ex-offender into the free commu-
nity.
D. Interests of Victims-Article 5
The Special Committee initially decided to include victims'
services within the ambit of the department of corrections and to
encourage victims to participate in the sentencing process. Al-
though victims have been described as the "real 'clients' of the
criminal justice system,"' 28 it is becoming increasingly apparent
that their interests have been largely ignored by that system.12 9
Under the Model Act the offender, once he is placed in the custody
of the department and until his release, is provided with, among
other things, educational opportunities, necessary medical care, le-
gal assistance, job training and even a paying job; after release he
is assisted in finding gainful employment. Victims of crime, as a
direct consequence of the crime, often need similar assistance as
well as counseling services, compensation for the injury suffered,
assistance in claiming personal property used in evidence, infor-
mation about the criminal trial process and their role in it and, per-
haps most importantly, the encouragement to participate in that
process. 13 o Provisions of Article 5 of the Model Sentencing and
Corrections Act were drafted in the attempt to include victims in
the sentencing process and provide some assistance to them.
Article 5 implements a statewide commitment to victims by
fixing centralized responsibility for victims' programs in the de-
partment of corrections while at the same time providing authority
for regional implementation. A statewide department of correc-
tions, with the community programs and facilities mandated by
the Model Act, is well suited to fulfill the victims' needs. It is al-
128. COMMISSION ON VICTIM WITNESS ASSISTANCE, NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N.,
A PRIMER FOR MODEL VICTIM WrrNESS ASSISTANCE CENTERS (Undated).
129. E.g., COMMISSION ON VICTIM WITNESS ASSISTANCE, NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS
ASS'N, HELP FOR VICTIMS AND WITNESSES (1976) [hereinafter cited as HELP
FOR VICTIMS AND WITNESSES]; MARQUET=E UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND SOcIAL POLICY, VICTIMS AND WITNESSES (1976).
130. See Jones, A Cost Analysis of Federal Victim Compensation, in SAMPLE
SURVEYS OF THE VICTIMS OF CRIME 189,196-200 (W. Skogan ed. 1976); HELP FOR
VICTMS AND WITNESSES, supra note 129.
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ready equipped to provide any of the services needed by victims
because it is providing similar service to offenders.
It could be argued that the provisions of Article 5 and other sec-
tions of the Act designed to meet victim needs, 13 1 are not suffi-
ciently inclusive. The limited nature of the provisions is evidenced
by their primary thrust which requires the department to refer vic-
tims to services rather than to provide the services within the de-
partment. 32 Nonetheless the Committee decided not to expand
the provisions, particularly in areas in which services would be
provided directly by the department, and to avoid completely the
area of crime victims' reparations. The reason behind the decision
to avoid dealing comprehensively with victims' compensation and
services was twofold.
First, it was felt that, although there are strong policy reasons in
favor of including victims' services as part of the program responsi-
bility of a department already providing similar services to offend-
ers, the approach was novel and needed experimentation rather
than immediate legislative mandate. This was believed to be par-
ticularly true in light of the fact that comprehensive services would
require considerable additional state funding.
Second, many states have already enacted, or are in the process
of enacting, victims' compensation statutes. Too extensive an in-
tertwining of victims' compensation with the Model Sentencing
and Corrections Act might complicate the enactment of the Model
Act. 133 The services provided at present in the Model Act can, in
other words, mesh comfortably with almost any existing state vic-
tims' compensation scheme.
The decision to exclude compensation to crime victims has,
however, led to some unfortunate distinctions between what are
properly victims' services for purposes of the Model Act and what
are aspects of victims' compensation and thus to b.e excluded from
this Act whether or not presently included within the Uniform
Crime Victims Reparations Act. This decision, for example, has
prevented a complete interlocking of the sentencing system, which
permits victim input, and the duties of a Crime Victims Repara-
tions Board. Thus, although it may have been advisable to charge
the Board with an obligation to seek restitution from offenders and
to provide information to the Sentencing Commission, there was
131. E.g., MSCA §§ 3-205 [Disclosure of Presentence Reports], 3-207 [Sentencing
Hearing], and 3-602 [Modification or Waiver].
132. See MSCA § 2-203(7).
133. The Act does include, however (Section 5, Part 2), a place for states to insert
the NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNI-
FORM CRIME VICTIMs REPARATIONS ACT (1973).
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no direct way to accomplish this without drafting additional provi-
sions with respect to crime victims reparations.
In providing the limited provisions of Article 5 it was hoped that
states would use these provisions as a base and expand their vic-
tims' services as they gained experience. The Special Committee
was also hopeful that states might provide additional services to
assist victims. 134 The present provisions, then, represent a founda-
tion upon which to develop and expand victims' services.
IV. THE DRAFTING PROCESS
In 1974 the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration pro-
vided funds to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws for the drafting of a sentencing and corrections
act.135 Pursuant to Conference policy two committees of commis-
sioners were appointed to work on the Act. The Special Commit-
tee to Draft the Act 36 had primary drafting responsibility; a review
committee was appointed to follow and comment on the work of
the Special Committee.137 The Special Committee met a total of
seventeen times from its first meeting, November 28 to 30, 1975, to
its final meeting, March 31 to April 2, 1978. In 1976 and again in 1977
it presented a tentative draft of the Act to the Conference at its
annual meeting. 38 In August of 1978, after two prior readings, the
134. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1413(b) (West Supp. 1979) (authority to photo-
graph evidence in lieu of retention of evidence).
135. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
136. Wallace Rudolph, Dean of the University of Puget Sound Law College, was
chairman of the Special Committee from the inception of the drafting project
until September 1977 and subsequently served as a special consultant to the
Special Committee. The Honorable Charles Joiner, Federal District Judge,
Detroit, Michigan, served as chairman from September 1977 until completion
of the drafting project. For a full list of commissioners who were members of
the Special Committee, and the dates of their participation, see MSCA at ii.
137. The Honorable Richard L. Jones, Chief Justice, Alabama Supreme Court,
served as chairman of the Review Committee throughout the drafting project.
Members of the Review Committee were present at most of the drafting
meetings of the Special Committee. For a full list of commissioners who
were members of the Review Committee, and the dates of their participation,
see MSCA at ii.
138. At the times of presentation of both the first and second tentative drafts the
Act was referred to as the Uniform Corrections Act. The title was expanded
to Sentencing and Corrections Act in order to more accurately reflect the
scope of the Act. Upon final reading and formal approval the Conference
voted to make the Sentencing and Corrections Act a model rather than a uni-
form Act. Conference criteria for uniform acts require that:
(1) There should be an obvious reason and demand for an act such
that its preparation will be a practical step toward uniformity of state
law or at least toward minimizing its diversity;
(2) There should be a reasonable probability that the act when ap-
proved either will be accepted and enacted into law by a substantial
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Conference formally adopted the Model Act.
The Special Committee to draft the Act was comprised of mem-
bers with different philosophical positions as to the proper func-
tioning of a sentencing and correctional system and widely varying
experience backgrounds that included academic, judicial (trial and
appellate levels) and practitioner, both within the field of criminal
law and in the private practice of law. These diverse backgrounds
and viewpoints were complemented by the viewpoints and experi-
ence of the individuals and groups 139 who acted as advisors to the
Special Committee. The drafting process reflected the extensive
discussion engendered by the impacting of the various exper-
iences and views of the participants.
V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to do justice to the complex and interrelated provi-
sions of the Model Sentencing and Corrections Act in this brief
and necessarily superficial overview. It may appear that the Act
proposes radical and impractical suggestions since only the basic
number of jurisdictions or, if not, will promote uniformity indirectly;
and
(3) The subject of the act should be such that lack of uniformity or
diversity of state law will tend to mislead, prejudice, inconvenience,
or otherwise adversely affect the citizens of the states in their activi-
ties or dealings in other states or with citizens of other states or in
moving from state to state.
2 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORMI STATE LAws PRO-
CEEDINGS IN COMMITEE OF THE WHOLE TO DIscuss THE UNIFORM SENTENCING
AND CORRECTIONS ACT, at 473-74 (1978). Criteria for uniform acts also recom-
mend avoiding denominating as uniform an act that is "entirely novel and
with regard to which neither a legislative or administrative experience is
available, controversial because of disparities in social, economic or political
policies, and of purely local or state concern and without substantial inter-
state implications." Id. at 474. After a consideration of these criteria the Con-
ference voted to adopt the Sentencing and Corrections Act as a model act.
139. Advisors included the American Bar Association, the American Association
of Wardens and Superintendents, the American Law-Psychology Society, the
National Conferences of State Trial and Appellate Judges, the National Coun-
cil on Crime and Delinquency, the National Legal Aid and Defender Associa-
tion, the American Medical Association (Division of Medical Practices,
Health Care in Correctional Associations), the AFL-CIO (Human Resources
Division), the United States Parole Commission, and the Council of State
Governments. The Committee also benefitted substantially from the partici-
pation of numerous correctional administrators and staff and from the formal
participation of the American Correctional Association which had at least
one representative present at all but the first six Committee meetings. The
Committee met with correctional administrators from Texas, Indiana, Michi-
gan, Idaho, Connecticut, Arizona and Illinois. Finally, the Federal Bureau of
Prisons furnished significant assistance by providing a Bureau representa-
tive to attend the January 1977 and each subsequent Committee meeting. For
a complete list of consultants and advisors, see MSCA at iii.
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thrusts of the provisions are discussed and the careful qualifica-
tions and transition sections have often been omitted. To be sure,
the Model Act is a forward-looking document; the Special Commit-
tee did not necessarily feel constrained by the existing law of pris-
oner's rights and often preferred to exercise the legislative
perogative of moving farther and faster than the courts in improv-
ing the conditions of prison life.
Enactment of the Model Act in its entirety will make the sen-
tencing and correctional process in some respects more expensive
and more difficult to administer. In several instances, perhaps a
majority, the provisions of the Act do not represent the consensus
position of correctional practitioners or sentencing judges. Yet
each provision was carefully considered and arguments for many
points of view were forcefully made. In every instance, the Com-
mittee had evidence or testimony that the provisions of the Act
could be practically implemented if the will and the means to do so
were present.
The Model Act provides the states with an integrated legislative
package for sentencing and correctional reform. For less ambi-
tious jurisdictions the separate provisions of the Act provide
model language and solutions for many complex problems facing
the criminal justice system.
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